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This paper argues that the advent of the WWW and the principles 
now developing for the move ‘social machines’ has posed serious 
challenges to traditional social theory.  In particular, it is argued 
that the concept of social machines and the forms of distributed 
agency  they  imply  amplify  ‘deep  flaws’  in  the  underlying 
principles  of  current  agency  theories  that  make  empirical  work 
using such frameworks ‘undecidable’.  The occasioning of social 
machines and the WWW here are examined for the ways in which 
the  traditional  models  of  agency,  involving  reflexivity/skill 
dynamics, can be dismantled and new principles for re-designed 
agency  theory  posed.    One  key  problem  and  three  re-design 
principles are identified. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The evolution of the Internet has led to an urgent need for a step 
change  in  our  understanding  of  human  practices  and  their 
engagement with and through the World Wide Web (WWW). The 
key word here is ‘engagement’.  Until the advent of the WWW 
social theory has had a tendency to view the relationship between 
technology and social life either in broadly structural or agential 
terms.    The  tendency  of  structural  approaches  is  to  develop 
models  of  causative  or  correlative  effects  arising  from  the 
interplay  between  organizations  of  human  actors  and  their 
technologies.  The tendency of agential approaches is to consign 
productive  practices  analytically  to  human  actors  and  object-
passivity  to  machines.    These  tendencies  are  inherent  in  the 
‘DNA’ of social theory itself. It is such a powerful inherence that 
most  theoretical  frameworks,  and  empirical  studies  based  on 
them,  generally  produce  an  account  that  hovers  at  some  point 
along a continuum between social determinism and technological 
determinism.   
According to Rose et al (2005) very influential frameworks that 
have tried to eschew social theoretical divisions between structure 
and  agency,  such  as  Giddens’  (1984)  Structuration  theory  and 
Latour’s  (2005)  actor  network  theory  (ANT),  have  failed  to 
convince, especially in empirical investigations, that analysis can 
move beyond a social-technological determinist continuum.  This 
is the case despite ANT aiming specifically for a ‘flat’ theory 
where the object of investigation is a distributed ‘assemblage’ of 
objects  and  actants.    Agency  is  properly  ascribed  to  the 
assemblage, rather than divisible human actors within it. This is 
an attractive framework for Webscience given a notional view of 
it.    Giddens  also  had  attempted  to  dissolve  structure  into  an 
account  of  practices  as  undertaken  by  human  actors  whose 
relationship  to  technology  is  as  to  types  of  action-dependent 
‘resources’.  Technologies here can include machines as well as 
the  technology  of  writing  (see  Giddens,  1981).    Human 
engagement with these ‘technologies–as-resources’ is viewed in 
structuration  theory  as  a  kind  of  Piagetian  (Piaget,  1970) 
accommodation-assimilation process.  From Piaget’s theories of 
child development Giddens (1984) speculated that the manner in 
which human practices both shape and are shaped by the non-
human  material  that  surrounds  it,  provided  an  archetype  for 
practice conceived as a duality of structure.  The latter is Giddens’ 
version  of  social  theoretical  ‘flatness’.  The  duality  of  structure 
hypothesis  enables  us  to  create  a  framework  for  understanding 
human-technology  engagement  as  a  process  of  the  mutual 
elaboration  and  structuring  of  human  actors  and  their 
technological environment.  At first sight this too is attractive as a 
social theoretical account for Webscience as it might provide a 
sophisticated  response  to  the  challenges  posed  by  Hendler  and 
Berners-Lee  (2009)  in  their  vision of WWW-based ‘interacting 
social machines’.  In this vision the development of the WWW is 
posed as a challenge to the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community 
as we move from the Semantic Web to the more human-machine 
‘interweaved’  arrangement  of  Social  Machines.    Developing 
‘social machines’ along the AI model has clear parallels with the 
structuration theory framework.  The shaping and re-shaping of 
social  machines  through  AI  methodologies,  we  are  tempted  to 
think,  is  precisely  parallel  to  Piaget’s  (accommodation-
assimilation) vision of human transformational capacity combined 
with  human  transformability  in  the  context  of  external  objects. 
Objects are re-patterned by the practices that operate on them; in 
the AI context the pattern is specifically an interactive program. 
We can also find changes in human actors who adapt to changing 
external patterns and arrangements of objects. Exactly the same 
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 principles  apply  to  machine  behaviours,  and  we  have  seen 
machines learning to act in real-time through the use of dynamic 
programming (e.g. Barto et al, 1995).  What is troubling about 
developing  theory  in  this  way  is  that  there  is  nothing  in  such 
frameworks  that:  (i)  enables  us  to  distinguish  AI  or  WWW  as 
objects from any other type of object or technology; (ii) we are 
required  to  develop  accounts  of  human-intelligent  systems’ 
processes based on categories of agency developed in relation to 
pre-intelligent  systems;  and,  (iii)  we  leave  ourselves  without  a 
social  theoretical  register  for  understanding  how  fundamentally 
new systems correlate with social change. 
The contention here is that while social theories, for sociological 
purposes,  are  routinely  heavily  challenged  by  the  empirical 
contexts  to  which  they  are  applied,  the  application  of  social 
theories  to  the  WWW  show  up  deeper  flaws.    That  is  to  say, 
sociological research challenges aspects of theory, but with the 
advent  of  the  WWW we are seeing problems in its  underlying 
principles.  The  WWW,  because  it  amplifies  profound  gaps  in 
theory requires us to radically re-think the fundamentals of theory, 
particularly those connected with the concept of agency.  The task 
of this paper is to briefly posit the nature of the issues and identify 
one fundamental principle of social theory that requires redesign 
in  the  light  of  WWW  developments.    The  following  section 
elaborates further on the character of the problem. 
2.  SOCIAL MACHINES’ CHALLENGE TO 
SOCIAL THEORY 
2.1  The Problem of Undecidability 
Computer  scientists  and  mathematicians  working  on  Turing’s 
problems  are  long  familiar  with  the  problem  of  undecidability, 
where it is not possible to construct a single algorithm, given a 
defined complexity, to admit of a yes/no solution.  In social theory 
a similar problem now arises.  The kinds of analytical complexity 
given us by the social-WWW nexus seem to be of a qualitatively 
different  kind  of  ‘order’  than  previous  social-technology 
complexes  (cf.  Gane,  2004).    Attempts  to  make  comparisons 
between  pre-  and  post-new  technologies  using  current  social 
theories  leave  interpretations  of  data  undecided  (Vass,  2008; 
2012) as to the impact of technology on social issues.  This has 
less  to  do  with  problems  connected  with  how  social  theories 
provide  analytical  frameworks  mappable  to  methodological 
categories  than  it  has to  do  with  the fundamental definition of 
agency and how we define the ‘unit of action’ in social theory.  
This has been a long term issue is sociology since Parsons (1949) 
attempted to solve the problem of definition of ‘the act’ in his 
seminal work The Structure of Social Action.  Recent adaptations 
of  his  ideas  for  life  in  the  twenty-first  century  (e.g.  Fox  et  al, 
2005) hardly mention the impact of new technologies because the 
latter  is  not  seen  as  challenging  the  fundamental  premises  of 
definition.  In recent sociological work such as that of Urry (2000, 
2007),  attempts  are  made  to  construct  Web  and  technology 
friendly  concepts  of  information  and  activity  ‘flows’.    Such 
concepts appear to offer the basis of a social theoretical narrative 
that  can  accommodate the  necessarily  ‘distributed’  character  of 
agency  under  conditions  given  us  by  the  WWW  (cf.  Malsch, 
2001, Vass, 2012). The concept of ‘flow’ is rooted in Parsons’ 
original schema and is called ‘flow’ by way of marking how far 
social  change  has  impacted  on  the  contexts  of  human  activity 
since  ‘more  stable’  periods  in  modernity.    In  other  words,  the 
concept  of  flow  and  how  human  activities,  resources, 
communication systems, forms of mobility etc. can be described 
by it refer to the same definitions of action established by Parsons.  
If this were not the case it would be very difficult to define exactly 
‘what’  flows’.    Ironically,  recent  Parsonian  critical  work  (e.g. 
Bortolini,  2007)  argues  that  when  Parsons  first  conceived  of 
definitions of agency and ‘the act’ as a unit of analysis he was 
already  thinking  of  action  as a kind of flow to which the new 
category could be applied. The consequence of all this for theories 
that adopt Urry’s line is that when examining any human-social-
technical complex it is not possible to analytically demonstrate the 
impact of a technology as implying any kind of qualitative social 
change.  Similarly, there is no way of being able to distinguish 
qualitatively between any type of technology or object that comes 
into the purview of the human agent be it a hammer, a crossbow, a 
hair-dryer or an AI-driven aircraft flight control system.  Urry’s 
analyses of the impact of new technologies and the way in which 
agency is said to be modified within the ‘new’ complexes they 
form, I suggest, are entirely ‘undecidable’. Clearly, being able to 
make distinctions between such objects and their role in broader 
complexes  is  key  to  responding  to  the  Webscience  agenda  of 
Social Machines such as understanding: ‘what forces govern the 
birth, evolution and demise of social machines?’ and ‘ Can the 
operation, function and output of social machines be described or 
identified in terms of a finite set of  “social primitives” comprised 
of both computational and social functions?’ (WWW2013).   
2.2  The Source of the Problem 
The theoretical challenges posed by the advent of social machines 
as stated above impact centrally on social theories of agency just 
as the challenge to AI posed by Hendler and Berners-Lee (2009) 
targets  the  forms  that  social-machine  interactions  that  can  be 
imagined and developed.  The problem of such ‘inter-actions’ is 
that they are by origin types of distributed agency.  As Malsch 
(2001) and Rammert (2008) argue social theory must ask ‘where 
is the action?’ and conclude that we must develop understanding 
of  distributed  agency  to  answer  this.    The  WWW  and  social 
machines we can anticipate create a qualitative step change in the 
basis  of  agency  itself  since,  as  I  suggest,  systems  are  now 
produced  which  are  by  origin  distributed.    Potentially  this 
represents a paradigm shift in the development of the cybernetic 
imagination  which  should  inaugurate  a  new  framework  for 
understanding agency (cf. Webber and Vass, 2010).   
The  old  framework  that  leads  to  undecidability  with  regard  to 
agency  and  change  is  predicated  on  the  manner  in  which  AI, 
cognitive science and social theory formalize an entirely notional 
analysis of action based on a polarity between, what are always 
taken  to  be,  two  kinds  of  sub-actions.    These  sub-actions  are 
characterized  slightly  differently  in  different  disciplines: 
cognition-automation  (Pask,  1961);  reflexivity-skill  (Giddens, 
1984); schemata-habit repertoire (Bourdieu, 1990).  My own term 
for each of these polarities adapted for social theoretical purposes 
is Hermeneutic-Embodied (H-E).  In practice, our definition of 
the  act  as  a  unit  of  analysis,  our  understanding  of  the  ‘order’ 
produced by acts, and our means of investigating the perceived 
produced  order  of  events  has  been  dependent  always  on 
distinguishing  the  hermeneutic  (problem-solving,  thought-
requiring) events from the automated, routinized or skilled aspects 
of events.  This polarity has survived through social theory since 
before  Parsons.    The  problem  is  its  deployment  cannot  tell  us 
anything  about  the  difference  between  distributed  and 
undistributed  agency.    If  we  take  the  example  of  a  distributed 
complex such as flying an Airbus to Tenerife (Rammert, 2008) we 
can identify and plot on a map the distribution of hermeneutical events  within  systems’  AI  programs,  human  actors  problem-
solving  in  various  geographically  dispersed  locations,  together 
with  automated  elements  from  bureaucratic  procedures  in  air 
traffic  control  through  to  on  board  electronic  controls  of  fuel 
delivery to the aircraft’s engines.  However, there is nothing we 
can  say  in  our  description  of  the  ‘order’  and  ‘sequencing’ 
produced  by  this  that  allows  us  to  create  any  benchmarks  for 
distinguishing  this  order  from  one  created  by  ostensibly 
undistributed events.   
This  limitation,  I  suggest  below,  is  derivable  entirely  from  the 
limitations inherent in the H-E model itself.   
 
 
3.  PROLEGOMENON FOR THE RE-
DESIGN OF SOCIAL THEORIES OF 
AGENCY 
From the identification of the problem in section 2 we may now 
proceed  to  identify  how  the  standard  principle  underlying  the 
relationship of agency to social orders may begin to be dismantled 
in the light of the manner in which the WWW forces us to re-
imagine  agency.    The  following  three  points  provide  a 
prolegomenon to supersede the limitations identified above and 
provide revised principles of theory design for distributed agency. 
Firstly, within the H-E framework the definition of complexity is 
already defined by what are categorized as hermeneutic and what 
embodied  moments  of  interactions.    So  two  co-located  actors 
where one is giving the other verbal instructions in how to tie 
shoe-laces  is  a  non-complex  undistributed  event.    Whereas 
geographically separated musicians collaborating in real time and 
editing  music  online  via  the  WWW  suggests  complexity  and 
distributed agency.  Interestingly the situation of learning to tie 
shoe-laces is  practically  the more difficult task than organizing 
and performing a jam on the Web.  What H-E based models are 
not  capable  of  grasping  is  the  relation  between  H  and  E, 
reflexivity and skill etc..  It is always assumed in social theoretical 
models  that  H somehow  articulates E  and  produces order: that 
ideologies,  cognitive  events  structure  routine  while  the  latter 
provides material for cognition to adapt to.   
Secondly,  when  engaged  with  different  kinds  of  empirical 
contexts we can identify qualitatively different kinds and levels of 
H and E than available in the Parsonian-inflected models social 
theory  habitually  uses.    For  example,  Kristeva  (1981)  has 
distinguished  between  levels  and  types  of  embodied/routinized  
activity; and Billig (2005) identifies qualitatively different aspects 
of socially produced styles of cognition and reflexivity.  We must 
imagine that in a world of distributed-agentic events there is more 
to examine in terms of what exactly is distributed than simple H-E 
models allow. 
Thirdly, if we ‘split the H-E atom’ and identify more sub-atomic 
features of social-technological complexes than hitherto imagined 
we are in a better position to understand what kinds of strategies 
of  coherence  are  available  to  constitute  and  elaborate  the 
constellation of events and objects that make up any complex.  I 
suggest that an analysis of sub-H-E features of interaction would 
give  us  a  grasp  of  how  social  change  takes  place  through 
alterations to the more definable strategies of coherence that are 
applied to events by human and technological agents.   
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